1 Person Killed & 10 Injured at Arens Controls, Arlington Heights, Illinois Plant

Police confirmed that the one person killed in an explosion at Arens Controls in Arlington Heights is an Itasca man.

Investigators will be back Wednesday to try to determine what caused the explosion in the company’s electronics testing area Tuesday that also injured 12 other people, including three police officers and two firefighters who responded.

Neil Nicholson of Itasca suffered serious injuries in the explosion and was pronounced dead at the scene, according to police. None of the other injuries were life-threatening, Arlington Heights Fire Chief Glenn Eriksen said.

The blast happened around 8:30 a.m. inside the two-story building at 3602 N. Kennicott Ave., just north of Dundee Road and east of Route 53.

So far, authorities say the explosion appears to be accidental, but investigators from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Office of the Illinois State Fire Marshal, and the Arlington Heights Police Forensics Unit have not made any final ruling.

“There’s a lot of damage inside, so it’s hard to tell right now if it was the chemical itself or the machine,” Arlington Heights Police Cmdr. Ken Galinski said. “There’s a lot of destruction and devastation in there from the equipment that exploded.”

OSHA spokesman Scott Allen said agency investigators will be interviewing employees and witnesses, and their investigation could take up to sx months.

“We’ll try to figure out if there are any OSHA standards that may have been violated and try to figure out what caused this so we can help avoid having something like this happening again,” Allen said.

One thing investigators are looking at is whether potassium hydroxide — a potentially explosive and toxic chemical — was a factor in the explosion.

“It was a very violent explosion. There’s twisted metal, buckled fencing, things like that,” Ericksen said. “The roof kind of buckled up where the explosion occurred.”

The explosion also sparked a small fire, which was quickly extinguished, and released a diluted form of potassium hydroxide into the air, Eriksen said.

The chemical is a skin and respiratory irritant, and reacts with some common metals to produce potentially explosive hydrogen gas, according to the website of Northstar Chemical, a distributor of industrial chemicals.

“At this point in time, we don’t know what role the chemical had in the accident, if it had any role at all,” Ericksen said.

The company’s CEO was quoted in a brief statement the company released Tuesday evening.

“Our heartfelt thoughts and prayers are with the Arens Control Company, LLC employees and their families in the aftermath of this morning’s tragic accident at our factory in Arlington Heights,” Kenneth C. Kunin said. “All our efforts will go into supporting them while simultaneously working and cooperating with public safety officials and investigators to ascertain exactly what happened and why.”

Two police officers from Arlington Heights and one from Buffalo Grove were the first to arrive on the scene and didn’t have protective gear to prepare them for the amount of smoke and chemicals from the explosion as they entered the building to search for victims. The officers were treated at the hospital for symptoms including coughing, chest pain and headaches.

“They’re going to be fine. They were released from the hospital. They’re taking a few days off, and hopefully they’ll be back to work soon,” Galinski said.

Northwest Community Hospital in Arlington Heights treated five Arens Controls employees for exposure to potassium hydroxide, according to a hospital spokesman. The hospital also treated two Arlington Heights firefighters for presumed inhalation-related injuries.

After the initial response, officials used fans to ventilate the building and waited several hours before going back inside due to the amount of smoke and possible chemicals in the air.

The early morning blast was a shock to both employees and neighbors who reported hearing a loud boom from the back of the business, which houses both offices and an assembly area where controls are made for heavy equipment such as trucks and planes.

Although most of the damage to the building was interior, the explosion damaged the roof and sent stones from atop the building flying, damaging 20 cars in the parking lot, officials said.

Employee Shawn Kelley, a welder who started his shift at 6 a.m., was sitting in his car eating his breakfast when he heard the explosion. Stones rained down, shattering the window of his Honda Accord LX, he said.

“It was loud. I heard the explosion from the roof and all the way down,” Kelley said. “I saw a lot of rock.”

Resident Bob Lee, who lives nearby, was talking a walk when he heard the boom, which he likened to “a truck exhaust backfiring.”

Then he watched as ambulances from five towns attended to people outside the building.

“There were women who were pretty shook up. They were holding on to each other,” Lee said.

The 50 employees in the building at the time were evacuated, but officials said surrounding businesses in the mainly industrial area were never in any danger. Arens employees huddled in the parking lot and lawn until midmorning when they were sent home for the day.

Kunin called Tuesday’s explosion “a horrible accident.”

“Right now, our primary concern is with the employees and the family of the deceased,” he said.

Deaths & Injury Incidents on the Rise at Restaurants Using Liquid CO2

Video Courtesy of the Phoenix Fire Department ®

Carbon dioxide blamed for Pooler McDonald’s death

9/14/2011 By Constance Cooper
Carbon dioxide leaking into the walls of a Pooler McDonald’s caused an 80-year-old woman to die last week, investigators have found.

It’s the third time in six years carbon dioxide sickened people at a U.S. McDonald’s.

Pooler death

Pooler police chief Mark Revenew said Anne Felton of Ponte Vedra, Fla., died of asphyxiation after carbon dioxide, used to make the restaurant’s sodas fizzy, leaked into the women’s bathroom of the McDonald’s on Sept. 7.

Revenew said a line used to funnel excess carbon dioxide out of the restaurant got disconnected. The gas, which is kept in tanks in a back room of the McDonald’s, was flowing into the wall next to the women’s bathroom instead of going outside.

Pooler Fire Chief Wade Simmons said the gas runs from the back room into the wall next to the women’s bathroom, then goes up and over the bathroom, running in the ceiling for about 25 feet before reaching the drink machines.

Revenew said that, “given the construction of the restroom, there was very little room for this stuff to dissipate.”

Investigators don’t know yet how the line disconnected, Revenew said, but video surveillance shows that shortly before Felton and Carol Barry — a 56-year-old Jacksonville, Fla., resident — were found unconscious in the bathroom, the restaurant’s carbon dioxide tanks were being refilled.

Revenew and Pooler Fire Chief Wade Simmons said the lines have been repaired. Asked if he would feel safe going to the restaurant now, Revenew said, “I wouldn’t hesitate at all.”

Nine sickened

Nine people — including three firefighters, a McDonald’s employee and a Savannah family of three who tried to help Felton and Barry — were taken to the hospital with dizziness and trouble breathing. Felton died the next day. The other eight people have since been released from Memorial University Medical Center.

John and Monique Palmaccio, franchisees of the McDonald’s, located off U.S. 80 near Interstate 95, released the following statement Wednesday: “… We are committed to running a safe, welcoming restaurant. We worked closely with the authorities to determine the cause of this incident and we’ve taken action to correct the situation. Authorities have conducted a thorough investigation and determined that the restaurant is safe. We are now open for customers …”

Firefighters were called to the McDonald’s about noon Sept. 7. The restaurant reopened late that afternoon and shut down again about 10 p.m. Tuesday. Pooler authorities said they were testing the lines by filling them with carbon dioxide, and the restaurant’s owners decided to shut down for the safety of employees and patrons.

Cases reported in Phoenix, Florida

According to a material safety data sheet on the gas, carbon dioxide in high concentrations can quickly crowd out the oxygen in the air, leading to dizziness, unconsciousness and, sometimes, death.

Simmons said a Phoenix Fire Department captain contacted him Friday about a carbon dioxide incident that happened at a McDonald’s in that city May 31. That’s when Simmons and Revenew started looking into a possible Pooler leak.

“I’d like to thank the Phoenix Fire Department for putting us on the right track,” Simmons said.

A pregnant, 24-year-old McDonald’s employee passed out in the stairwell to the basement of a Phoenix McDonald’s after being exposed to carbon dioxide, according to the department’s report on the incident.

Two firefighters who responded to the scene also got sick. A broken line on the carbon dioxide tank was the cause, according to the report. The manager of the restaurant said the tank had been refilled a couple hours before the woman passed out.

Carbon dioxide caused two people to die in a Sandford, Fla., McDonald’s in 2005, according to Sandford Fire Department Deputy Chief Craig Radzak.

Radzak said an 18-year-old McDonald’s employee was trying to help a driver for the company that refills the tanks when he died of asphyxiation. The 50-year-old driver died when he tried to help the teen.

McDonald’s open

Simmons and Revenew went to the Pooler McDonald’s Friday night to investigate possible leaking carbon dioxide but didn’t find elevated levels of the gas in the air, so they allowed the restaurant to stay open.

On Saturday, portable bathrooms were set up outside the restaurant. Pooler authorities said the owners rented the bathrooms as a convenience to customers during testing. They still were being used Wednesday.

Simmons praised the Palmaccios for their help with the investigation, which is ongoing.

“They have listened to us,” Simmons said. “They haven’t tried to stonewall or hide anything.”

The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration also is conducting an investigation into the leak. OSHA Area Director Robert Vazzi said he couldn’t comment on the status of that investigation Wednesday other than to say it’s ongoing.

—————————————————————————————————————

The primary health dangers of carbon dioxide are:

Asphyxiation. Releasing any gas in a confined or unventilated area can lower the concentration of oxygen to a level that is immediately dangerous to life or health (see the first link under Further Reading below) . Be very careful entering a truck or room where solid or gaseous CO2 is stored. Likewise, some businesses and laboratories store Dry Ice in large top-loading ice chests; be very careful sticking your head down to retrieve a block from the bottom.

Concentrations greater than 10% in air. Remember those chemical reactions we saw above? These are chemical equilibria, which means that the relative amounts of products and reactants depend on their concentrations. Large changes in carbon dioxide or bicarbonate concentration can lead to kidney damage, coma or even death! For a great technical discussion of the role of bicarbonate in the body see this laboratory tutorial Blood, Sweat, and Buffers: pH Regulation During Exercise at WUSTL.

Further Reading

Fatal Exposure to Methylene Chloride Among Bathtub Refinishers — United States, 2000–2011

February 24, 2012 / 61(07);119-122

In 2010, the Michigan Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation program conducted an investigation into the death of a bathtub refinisher who used a methylene chloride–based paint stripping product marketed for use in aircraft maintenance. The program identified two earlier, similar deaths in Michigan. Program staff members notified CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which in turn notified the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In addition to the three deaths, OSHA identified 10 other bathtub refinisher fatalities associated with methylene chloride stripping agents that had been investigated in nine states during 2000–2011. Each death occurred in a residential bathroom with inadequate ventilation. Protective equipment, including a respirator, either was not used or was inadequate to protect against methylene chloride vapor, which has been recognized as potentially fatal to furniture strippers and factory workers (1,2) but has not been reported previously as a cause of death among bathtub refinishers. Worker safety agencies, public health agencies, methylene chloride–based stripper manufacturers, and trade organizations should communicate the extreme hazards of using methylene chloride–based stripping products in bathtub refinishing to employers, workers, and consumers. Employers should strongly consider alternative methods of bathtub stripping and always ensure worker safety protections that reduce the risk for health hazards to acceptable levels. Employers choosing to use methylene chloride–based stripping products must comply with OSHA’s standard to limit methylene chloride exposures to safe levels.

The Michigan program is one of nine state Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation programs funded by NIOSH to identify work-related injury deaths, conduct investigations to identify contributory factors, and develop recommendations for preventing deaths in similar situations. The findings of these investigations and subsequent recommendations are summarized in narrative reports broadly disseminated to employer and worker groups and posted at the NIOSH Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation website.*

OSHA Investigation

OSHA and OSHA-approved State Occupational Safety and Health Plans† conduct investigations of worker deaths and enforce compliance with worker safety and health regulations. A review of the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), a database for federal and state OSHA investigations, identified 12 methylene chloride–related deaths associated with professional bathtub refinishing operations during 2000–2011. One of the three deaths identified by the Michigan program was not in IMIS because the decedent was self-employed and therefore outside OSHA’s enforcement jurisdiction. The ages of the 13 decedents ranged from 23 to 57 years (median = 39 years) (Table). Twelve were male.

Ten different products were associated with the 13 deaths. Six of the products were marketed for use in the aircraft industry, the rest for use on wood, metal, glass, and masonry. None of the product labels mentioned bathtub refinishing. The percentage of methylene chloride in the products ranged from 60% to 100%.

Toxicology tests from specimens collected at autopsy indicated methylene chloride blood levels ranging from 18 to 223 mg/L in the six decedents for whom values were recorded; a level of <2 mg/L is expected in a person working within the OSHA allowable air standard for exposure to methylene chloride fumes (3). Among the five decedents whose carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) levels were tested, levels ranged from absent to mildly elevated (range: zero to 5%) (Table), indicating that carbon monoxide was unlikely to have been the primary cause of death (although the durations of exposure to methylene chloride and receipt of oxygen during resuscitation efforts, two factors that can affect COHb levels, were not known).

Analysis of IMIS data regarding deaths from methylene chloride showed an increase in cases involving bathtub refinishing since 2000. During 1976–1999, only two (8%) of all methylene chloride deaths investigated by OSHA were linked to bathtub refinishing. Since 2000, 13 (75%) of the methylene chloride deaths investigated by OSHA occurred during bathtub refinishing. Following is an illustrative case report.

Case Report

In March 2010, the co-owner of a Michigan-based bathtub refinishing company, aged 52 years, was refinishing a bathtub in an apartment bathroom that was approximately 5 feet by 8 feet (1.5 meters by 2.4 meters) with an 8-foot (2.4-meter) ceiling. He was using an aircraft paint stripper product that contained 60%–100% methylene chloride. The bathroom ceiling had a 50 cubic feet per minute (1.4 cubic meters per minute) ventilation fan; however, the fan was off. The man wore latex gloves and did not wear respiratory protection or use engineering controls (e.g., a local exhaust ventilation system) to vent the methylene chloride vapor.

Approximately 90 minutes after the man began working on the tub, he did not answer a call to his cellular telephone. An apartment maintenance man entered the apartment to look for the man and found him behind the closed bathroom door, unresponsive, and slumped over the tub. The maintenance man telephoned 911 and then a second maintenance man. The two maintenance men pulled the man off of the tub. The second maintenance man, a certified emergency medical technician, began cardiopulmonary resuscitation. When emergency responders arrived an estimated 2 minutes later, they moved the victim to another part of the apartment and continued resuscitation before transporting him to a local hospital. The man was declared dead at the hospital.

The decedent had a history of hyperlipidemia, and his autopsy revealed mild coronary atherosclerosis and mucus plugging of bronchi and bronchioles. His blood methylene chloride level at autopsy was 50 mg/L. All other toxicology test results from the autopsy, including COHb, were reported as negative. The death certificate listed the cause of death as “sudden cardiorespiratory arrest due to or as a consequence of inhalation of toxic fumes.”

Based on the size of the bathroom, size of the tub, and an estimate that 6 fluid ounces (177 mL) of methylene chloride-based stripper was used during a typical job, exposure levels were estimated for both the tub and bathroom environments. The concentration of methylene chloride vapor was estimated at 92,949 to 154,916 parts per million (ppm) in the bathtub and 5,099 to 8,499 in the bathroom. The man’s estimated time-weighted average exposure to methylene chloride, based on 1 hour of exposure, was 637 to 1,062 ppm in the bathroom and 11,618 to 19,364 ppm in the tub, many times greater than OSHA’s short-term exposure limit of 125 ppm, 8-hour permissible exposure limit of 25 ppm, and the NIOSH immediately dangerous to life and health level of 2,300 ppm (4,5).§

Reported by

Debra Chester, MS, Kenneth D. Rosenman, MD, Div of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Michigan State Univ. George R. Grimes, MD, Uniformed Svcs Univ of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland. Kathleen Fagan, MD, Occupational Safety and Health Admin. Dawn N. Castillo, MPH, Div of Safety Research, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC. Corresponding contributor: Kenneth D. Rosenman, rosenman@msu.edu, 517-353-1846.

Editorial Note

Methylene chloride is a highly volatile, colorless, toxic chemical that is widely used as a degreaser, process catalyst, and paint remover (6). Because methylene chloride vapors are heavier than air, in the case described in this report they likely remained in the bathtub after application. To use products containing methylene chloride safely, work areas must be well-ventilated, and when levels of methylene chloride exceed exposure limits even after implementation of engineering and work practice controls, workers must use respiratory protective equipment, such as tight-fitting, full-face, supplied-air respirators (4). OSHA’s standard for methylene chloride, which was promulgated in 1997, covers all occupational exposures to the chemical (e.g., general industry, shipyard employment, and construction). The standard mandates that air monitoring, medical surveillance, hazard communication, and personal protective equipment be in place where methylene chloride is used.

Methylene chloride primarily is absorbed via inhalation, although it also is absorbed effectively by intact skin. To protect against skin absorption, butyl rubber or polyvinyl alcohol gloves must be worn; latex gloves like those used in the case described in this report will not protect against skin absorption. Methylene chloride is metabolized to formaldehyde and carbon monoxide (6,7) and is categorized as a carcinogen (8).

COHb levels in the blood as great as 10%–12% can result from methylene chloride exposure (2,6). COHb levels in this range can cause headache, nausea, or dizziness. Arrhythmias have been reported at COHb levels as low as 4%–6%, angina at levels as low as 3.9%, and electrocardiographic changes at levels as low as 2.0% (6,9). In the 13 deaths analyzed in this report, the data indicate that carbon monoxide was not likely the cause of death. Because methylene chloride, like many solvents, acts as a central nervous system depressant causing narcosis at high concentrations, the decedents likely lost consciousness and died from respiratory depression. Consistent with this conclusion were the high methylene chloride blood levels at the time of autopsy found in the six persons whose methylene chloride blood levels were quantified (Table). However, because eight of the 13 decedents had cardiac disease (six with coronary artery disease and five with a cardiomyopathy or valvular disease), the arrhythmogenic effect of the methylene chloride itself or of its metabolite, carbon monoxide, might have been a contributing factor in their deaths.

Methylene chloride–based stripping products usually are applied with a paint brush or aerosol can. The products cause the bathtub coating to pucker, allowing it to be easily scraped away so that a new finish can be applied. In a small, enclosed bathroom, it is unlikely that a methylene chloride stripping agent can be used safely. Alternative methods of bathtub stripping, such as sanding, should be used. Alternative chemicals that could be used include petroleum distillates, acetate, mineral spirits, caustic paste, and acid-based formulas. However, these other methods and chemicals have their own hazards, and all employers and employees should be well aware of their risks (10). Potential worker exposures should be evaluated to determine whether the work process is safe and to ensure that workers are protected.

The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, the number of deaths identified by OSHA likely is an underestimate because the IMIS database does not include all occupational deaths and injuries (e.g., those of self-employed workers). Second, the data examined in this report are limited to workers and do not address potential risks to consumers who have access to some of these products. Finally, additional deaths among bathtub refinishers might have been ascribed to heart disease when they were actually caused by methylene chloride.

Both OSHA and NIOSH are issuing communications regarding the risk for death from bathtub refinishing using methylene chloride strippers and the availability of safer products. The Michigan program distributed an investigation report and a hazard alert (10) after identifying bathtub refinishers in Michigan through Internet directories.

Methylene chloride also presents a risk to persons among the general public who seek to do their own bathtub refinishing. A review of the OSHA IMIS system, the Internet, and hardware stores, found 42 stripping products, 26 (62%) of which are readily available on the Internet or at local hardware stores. Many of these stripping products contain 60%–90% methylene chloride. Many Internet sites promote do-it-yourself bathtub stripping, and no state or federal restrictions exist on the use of methylene chloride stripping agents. The widespread availability of these products and their effectiveness puts both professional bathtub refinishers and do-it-yourselfers at risk. Public health agencies, worker safety agencies, manufacturers, and trade organizations should clearly communicate the extreme hazard posed by using methylene chloride–based stripping products in bathtub refinishing.

References

  1. Hall AH, Rumack BH. Methylene chloride exposure in furniture-stripping shops: ventilation and respirator practices. J Occup Med 1990;32:33–7.
  2. Mahmud M, Kales SN. Methylene chloride poisoning in a cabinet worker. Environ Health Perspect 1999;107:769–72.
  3. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Case studies in environmental medicine: methylene chloride. Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; 1990.
  4. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Occupational safety and health standards: methylene chloride. Washington, DC: US Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=standards&p_id=10094External Web Site Icon. Accessed February 17, 2012.
  5. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Pocket guide to chemical hazards. Cincinnati, OH: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; 1997.
  6. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Toxicological profile for methylene chloride (update): draft for public comment. Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; 1998.
  7. DiVincenzo GD, Kaplan CJ. Uptake, metabolism and elimination of methylene chloride vapor by humans. Toxicol AppI Pharmacol 1981;59:130–40.
  8. National Toxicology Program. Report on carcinogens. 12th ed. Research Triangle Park, NC: US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National Toxicology Program; 2011. Available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/twelfth/roc12.pdf Adobe PDF fileExternal Web Site Icon. Accessed February 17, 2012.
  9. Rosenman KD. Cardiovascular disorders. In: Levy BS, Wegman DH, Baron SL, Sokas RK, eds. Occupational and environmental health. 6th ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2011:492–504.
  10. Michigan Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation. Methylene chloride causes death of 3 MI bathtub refinishers. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University; 2011. Available at http://www.oem.msu.edu/userfiles/bathtubrefinishingha14.pdf Adobe PDF fileExternal Web Site Icon. Accessed February 17, 2012.

 

* Additional information available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face.

† Additional information available at http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/index.htmlExternal Web Site Icon.

§ Additional information available at http://www.oem.msu.edu/miface/10mi013report.pdf Adobe PDF fileExternal Web Site Icon.

 

What is already known on this topic?

Methylene chloride is a volatile, toxic, organic solvent used in cleaning and paint stripping and shown to be potentially fatal to furniture strippers and factory workers unless used in strict compliance with safety precautions.

What is added by this report?

Methylene chloride–based paint stripping agents used in bathtub refinishing have caused at least 13 deaths in the United States since 2000 among professional bathtub refinishers. Because of inadequate ventilation, safe use of a methylene chloride stripping agent in a small bathroom is unlikely.

What are the implications for public health practice?

Worker safety agencies, public health agencies, manufacturers of methylene chloride containing products, and trade organizations should clearly communicate to employers, workers, and the general public the extreme hazards of using methylene chloride–based stripping products in bathtub refinishing. Safer methods of bathtub stripping should be recommended.

 

TABLE. Deaths (N = 13) from methylene chloride among bathtub refinishers — United States, 2000–2011
Date State Age (yrs) Sex Location Stripping agent used Coronary artery disease Other cardiovascular disease Carboxyhemoglobin blood levels (%) Methylene chloride blood levels (mg/L)*
April 2000 New York 39 Male Apartment Not recorded —†
April 2001 Texas 29 Male Single-family home Eldorado Paint Remover-4028 No No Test not performed Positive
January 2002 Illinois 52 Male Townhouse Dayco Marine-Strip Heavy Duty Paint Remover Yes Yes Negative Test not performed
March 2004 Massachusetts 43 Male Apartment 5F5 Paint and Varnish Remover Yes No Test not performed Not recorded
January 2006 Florida 36 Male Single-family home Klean-Strip Premium Stripper No No 3 223
November 2006 Maryland 23 Male Apartment Benco #B4 Industrial Paint Remover No Yes Positive
May 2007 Michigan 57 Male Apartment Klean-Strip Premium Stripper Yes Yes Negative 100
May 2008 Indiana 27 Female Apartment SEM XXX Finish Stripper No No Test not performed 99
March 2010 Michigan 52 Male Apartment Tal-Strip II Aircraft Coating Remover Yes No Negative 50
June 2010 New York 31 Male Single-family home Recochem Paint and Varnish Remover No Yes <5 100
August 2010 Michigan 41 Male Single-family home Tal-Strip II Aircraft Coating Remover Yes No Test not performed Test not performed
February 2011 Georgia 49 Male Apartment Klean-Strip Aircraft Remover Yes Yes Test not performed 18
September 2011 Ohio 30 Male Apartment Rust-Oleum Aircraft Remover
* A level <2 mg/L is expected in persons working within the Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard.

† Information could not be obtained.

 

Use of trade names and commercial sources is for identification only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

References to non-CDC sites on the Internet are provided as a service to MMWR readers and do not constitute or imply endorsement of these organizations or their programs by CDC or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. CDC is not responsible for the content of pages found at these sites. URL addresses listed in MMWR were current as of the date of publication.

All MMWR HTML versions of articles are electronic conversions from typeset documents. This conversion might result in character translation or format errors in the HTML version. Users are referred to the electronic PDF version (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr) and/or the original MMWR paper copy for printable versions of official text, figures, and tables. An original paper copy of this issue can be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC 20402-9371; telephone: (202) 512-1800. Contact GPO for current prices.

**Questions or messages regarding errors in formatting should be addressed to mmwrq@cdc.gov.

New Website Launch for CCAR – Auto Safety, HazMat Testing & Information

Charlie Ayers, president of the Coordinating Committee for Automotive Repair (CCAR) announced the launch of a new website. CCAR currently serves hundreds of affiliates, thousand of users worldwide and sees millions of automotive safety and hazmat tests administered each year. In this past fiscal year alone, which ended in September, 2011 CCAR saw in excess of four million tests passed.

The new website at www.ccar- greenlink.org provides for a much needed face lift, a new platform allowing for ease of updating and the ability to provide greater access to information and product through blogs and other social channels.

The new site showcases the safe, clean and green philosophy that is CCAR. So green in fact, that the website itself is hosted on servers that are powered by wind. “It’s not just empty words about the environment for us here at CCAR,” says Ayers.

“Wind turbines generate the power to run our website and safety, cleanliness and care for our environment are at the core of our product offering. From automotive hazardous waste training to safety and pollution with our S/P2 training, to the actual awarding of “GreenLink Status” to collision and automotive repair shops around the country.”

CCAR Executive Director Daren Fristoe explains, “Automotive repair and collision shops can apply to earn ‘GreenLink’ shop status through CCAR and once approved, can display the designation to customers on counters, in windows and on their websites. This has been shown to increase traffic and sales from environmentally conscious potential customers,” he added. CCAR provides all the collateral material for display once a shop has earned the GreenLinkstatus.

Established in 1994, the Coordinating Committee for Automotive Repair is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization that works – internationally in scope – with the automotive industry, the insurance industry, OEM’s, career and technical schools, collision and automotive repair shops, governments, municipalities and other organizations to provide best practice information and training, and to measure improvements related to:

  • Pollution Prevention (P2).
  • Safety for all who repair or maintain vehicles as a profession, as well as those who work in related businesses.
  • Reduction of lost workdays due to accidents or job-related health issues.
  • Decreases in costs and liability exposure.
  • Reduction in costs of training in these areas.

CCAR has earned an exclusive alliance with the following United States Government entities:

  • EPA: Since 1995, CCAR has operated “CCAR-GreenLink®,” the National Environmental Compliance Assistance Center for Automotive Repair, in cooperation with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This free, web-based service provides a wide range of compliance and best practices information specifically for the auto repair industry.
  • OSHA: CCAR’s “Alliance” agreement with the US Department of Labor (DOL), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), works to develop best practices for those who work on or around vehicles to help protect employees’ health and safety. The agreement was first sign in 2004 and has been renewed every two years since.
  • DOT: At the request of the North American Automotive Hazmat Action Committee, a group of regulatory compliance specialists representing the major automotive manufacturers in North America, CCAR helped develop “HazmatU” an e-learning program for automotive dealers to address U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) training requirements for the shipment of hazardous materials.

In addition, CCAR provides the “S/P2” e-learning program in Safety and Pollution Prevention for the auto repair industry. HazmatU information is available at www.hazmatU.org – To learn more about CCAR, visit www.ccar- greenlink.org.

13 Methylene Chloride Related Deaths Linked To Bathtub Refinishing

The Michigan Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation program, which is 1 of 9 state Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation programs funded by NIOSH, began an investigation in 2010 to determine the cause of death of a bathtub refinisher, linked to methylene chloride-based paint stripper. The man who died used this stripping product, which was originally for use in aircraft.

While investigating his death, the program learned of two earlier deaths, also in Michigan, which were very similar to the death of this man.

After learning of these deaths, the team notified CDC‘s National Institute for Occupational Safety, who then notified Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA found 10 additional deaths linked to the bathtub refinisher methylene chloride stripping agents, which had been investigated between 2000 and 2011.

All of the deaths took place in home bathrooms which were not ventilated by the proper machinery to guard against methylene chloride vapor, which according to experts is extremely dangerous to workers in factories and furniture strippers, but until now no reports have told of deaths due to exposure to the vapor.

During their investigation, OSHA and OSHA-approved State Occupational Safety and Health Plans discovered 12 deaths related to methylene chloride, in relation to bathtub refinishing between 2000 and 2011, in people from ages 23 to 57. Out of these people, 12 were males.

The program determined that 10 products were related to the 13 fatalities, 6 of which were supposed to be used with aircraft, and the others were meant for use with glass, wood, metal, and masonry. The prevalence of methylene chloride in these products was between 60% and 100%.

Autopsy reports showed that the methylene chloride blood levels in 6 people who died and had autopsies performed were between 18 and 223 mg/L. An acceptable and expected level is <2 mg/L in someone who works in close proximity to methylene chloride fumes.

Five of the people who died were examined in terms of their carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) levels, and the levels were between 0 and 5%. This means that carbon monoxide most likely had nothing to do with the people’s deaths. However, the length of exposure to methylene chloride, and the amount of oxygen received during attempts to resuscitate the patients was unknown. These are two key factors which alter COHb levels.

It was determined by the researchers that between 1979 and 1999, a mere 8% of methylene chloride related fatalities were due to exposure to bathtub refinishing. However, 75% of deaths linked to methylene chloride since 2000, 75% were due to bathtub refinishing.

Written By Christine Kearney
Copyright: Medical News Today

OSHA Training – Introduction To Fall Protection

Fall Protection Guidelines

guardrail_systems
A synopsis of OSHA’s Fall Protection Standards (OSHA standard 29 CFR 1926.501 through 503).

Fall protection is generally thought of as:

  1. Guardrail systems
  2. Safety net systems
  3. Personal fall arrest systems
  4. Positioning device systems, and/or
  5. Warning line systems

The standard:

  • Covers most construction workers except persons inspecting, assessing, or investigating the workplace conditions prior to the start of work or after the completion of work.
  • Identifies areas or activities where fall protection is needed.
  • Sets a uniform threshold height of six (6) feet
  • Allows employers to select fall protection measures that are best suited for the work being performed.

Guardrail requirements:

  • Top edge height of top rails must be 42 inches (+/- 3 inches) above working/walking level & support 200 lb. force (use at least 2″x4″ lumber for wood top rails).
  • Mid rails, screens, mesh, intermediate vertical members, or equivalent emmbers shall be installed mid-way between the top rail and working/walking level & support 150 lb. force (use at least 1″x6″ lumber for wood mid rails).
  • Toe boards shall be 3.5 inches high & support 50 lb. force.
  • Posts shall be no more than 8 feet apart (use 2″x4″ lumber for wood posts).

gaurdrail_requirements
Fall Arrest Systems: Harness, Lanyard, Connectors & Anchors

  • Shall be inspected prior to each use.
  • Attachment point to body shall be in the center of the wearer’s back.
  • Limit fall to six (6) feet and prevent contact with lower levels.
  • Limit maximum deceleration distance to 3.5 feet.
  • D-rings & snaphooks must have minimum tensile strength of 5,000 pounds.
  • Lanyards & lifelines must have minimum breaking strength of 5,000 pounds.
  • Self retracting lifelines & lanyards that limit fall distance to 2 feet or less must have minimum tensile strength of 3,000 pounds applied to the device with lifeline fully extended. Greater than 2 feet the minimum tensile strength must be 5,000 pounds.
  • Anchorages must be capable of supporting at least 5,000 pounds.
  • Body belts & other positioning device systems are not a part of the personal fall arrest system.

Positioning Device Systems

  • Should limit falls to no more than 2 feet.
  • Secured to an anchor capable of supporting a potential impact of 2x the impact load of the employees fall or 3,000 pounds (whichever is less).
  • Requirements for d-rings, snaphooks & other connectors must meet those of  personal fall arrest systems.

Covers

  • On roadways, capable of support 2x the maximum axle load of the largest vehicle expected to impact the cover.
  • Capable of supporting 2x the weight of employees and equipment.
  • Must be secured when installed.
  • Color coded and marked “HOLE” or “COVER”.

Alternative Measures to Personal Fall Protection

Three alternatives include warning line systems, controlled access zones, and safety monitoring systems.  The employer must prove conventional fall protection is not feasible or would cause a greater hazard & develop a written fall protection program.  Does not include roofing, overhand bricklaying or residential construction practices.

Warning line systems

  • Only allowed on low-sloped roofs (less than or equal to 4×12 pitch).
  • Must be erected around all sides and not less than six (6) feet from the roof edge.
  • Flagged at least every 6 feet with high visibility material.
  • Rigged and supported so the line is between 34 inches and 39 inches.
  • Stanchions must be able to support a 16 pound horizontal force.
  • Warning line must be able to support a 500 pound minimum tensile strength.
  • Must be used in conjunction with another fall protection system.

Controlled access zones

  • Erected between 6 -25 feet from the unprotected/leading edge.
  • Control lines must consist of ropes, wires, tapes, or equivalent.
  • Flagged at least every 6 feet with high visibility material.
  • Rigged and supported so the line is between 39 inches and 45 inches.
  • Capable of support a minimum 200 lb. stress.
  • Extend along the entire length of the unprotected or leading edge and connected to each side of the guardrail system or wall.

Safety Monitoring Systems

  • Competent person is responsible for recognizing and warning employees of fall hazards.
  • Competent person must be on same working level.
  • Competent person must be able to communicate orally with workers.
  • Competent person must not have any other duties which distract from the monitoring duties.