“The Blowout on BP Deepwater Horizon” – A Disaster in the Making – Courtesy of 60 Minutes ®

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Video Courtesy of CBS / 60 Minutes ®

The federal agency responsible for ensuring that an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico was operating safely before it exploded last month fell well short of its own policy that inspections be done at least once per month, an Associated Press investigation shows.

Since January 2005, the federal Minerals Management Service conducted at least 16 fewer inspections aboard the Deepwater Horizon than it should have under the policy, a dramatic fall from the frequency of prior years, according to the agency’s records.

Under a revised statement given to the AP on Sunday, MMS officials said the last infraction aboard the rig, which blew up April 20, killing 11 and spewing millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, occurred in August 2003, not March 2007 as originally stated.

The inspection gaps and poor recordkeeping are the latest in a series of questions raised about the agency’s oversight of the offshore oil drilling industry. Members of Congress and President Barack Obama have criticized what they call the cozy relationship between regulators and oil companies and have vowed to reform MMS, which both regulates the industry and collects billions in royalties from it.

Earlier AP investigations have shown that the doomed rig was allowed to operate without safety documentation required by MMS regulations for the exact disaster scenario that occurred; that the cutoff valve which failed has repeatedly broken down at other wells in the years since regulators weakened testing requirements; and that regulation is so lax that some key safety aspects on rigs are decided almost entirely by the companies doing the work.

The AP sought to find out how many times government safety inspectors visited the Deepwater Horizon, and what they found. In response, MMS officials offered a changing series of numbers.

At first, officials said 83 inspections had been performed since the rig arrived in the Gulf 104 months ago, in September 2001. While being questioned about the once-per-month claim, the officials subsequently revised the total up to 88 inspections. The number of more recent inspections also changed – from 26 to 48 in the 64 months since January 2005.

No explanation was given initially for the upward revisions. On Sunday, the officials said additional inspections were discovered after MMS gathered more information from a deeper examination of its databases.

AP granted MMS officials anonymity because without that condition, communications staff at the Interior Department, which oversees MMS, would not have let them talk.

Reacting to the latest disclosures, House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Nick J. Rahall, D-W.Va., said while he applauded Interior Secretary Ken Salazar’s remedial actions, it seems “MMS has been asleep at the switch in terms of policing offshore rigs.” He said the committee, slated to hold hearings May 26-27, will examine these issues “in the context of what our offshore leasing program will look like in the future.”

Added Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., “While our priority now is to do everything possible to stop this spill and mitigate further damage, the administration’s actions will be a major component of what we investigate.”

Based on the last set of numbers provided, the Deepwater Horizon was inspected 40 times during its first 40 months in the Gulf – in line with agency policy.

Even using the more favorable numbers for the most recent 64 months, 25 percent of monthly inspections were not performed. The first set of data supplied to AP represented a 59 percent shortfall in the number of inspections.

Interior spokeswoman Kendra Barkoff would not comment on the inspection numbers. Instead, she offered a general statement: “We are looking at all the questions that are coming out of the Deepwater Horizon incident.”

In response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by AP, the agency has released copies of only three inspection reports, from Feb. 17, March 3 and April 1. According to the documents, inspectors spent two hours or less each time they visited the massive rig. Some information appeared to be “whited out,” without explanation.

In an e-mail to AP, an Interior Department official emphasized with italics that the MMS inspects rigs “at least once a month” when drilling is under way. Monthly inspections are an agency policy, though not required by regulation, said David Dykes, chief of the agency’s office of safety management for the Gulf region.

Last week, at a joint Coast Guard-MMS investigatory hearing in Kenner, La., Michael Saucier, MMS’s regional supervisor for field operations in the Gulf, said about inspections aboard the oil rigs: “We perform them at a minimum once a month, but we can do more if need be.”

The job falls to the 55 inspectors in the Gulf who are supposed to visit the 90 drilling rigs once per month and the approximately 3,500 oil production platforms once per year.

The Deepwater Horizon’s inspection frequency numbers struck Kenneth Arnold, a veteran offshore drilling consultant and engineer.

“I’d certainly question it,” he said. “I’d ask, ‘Why aren’t you doing it?’”

When the AP did ask, MMS and Interior would not answer directly. Instead providing a set of conditions when a rig would not typically be inspected – including during bad weather or when it is jumping among short-term jobs.

Transocean Ltd., which owned the Deepwater Horizon and leased it to BP PLC, would not provide a detailed accounting of the rig’s activity history. According to RigData, a Texas firm that monitors offshore activity in the Gulf, the Deepwater Horizon was working approximately 2,896 days of the 3,131 days since it started its first well – about 93 percent of the time. That number represents the total number of days between when it broke the seafloor during a drilling operation to when it was released to another site.

A summary of the inspection history said the Deepwater Horizon received six “incidents of noncompliance” – the agency’s term for citations.

The most serious occurred July 16, 2002, when the rig was shut down because required pressure tests had not been conducted on parts of the blowout preventer – the device that was supposed to stop oil from gushing out if drilling operations went wrong.

That citation was “major,” said Arnold, who characterized the overall safety record related by MMS as strong.

A citation on Sept. 19, 2002, also involved the blowout preventer. The inspector issued a warning because “problems or irregularities observed during the testing of BOP system and actions taken to remedy such problems or irregularities are not recorded in the driller’s report or referenced documents.”

During his Senate testimony last week, Transocean CEO Steven Newman said the blowout preventer was modified in 2005.

According to MMS officials, the four other citations were:

_ Two on May 16, 2002, for not conducting well control drills as required and not performing “all operations in a safe and workmanlike manner.”

_ One on Aug. 6, 2003, for discharging pollutants into the Gulf.

_ One on March 20, 2007, which prompted inspectors to shut down some machinery because of improper electrical grounding.

Late last week, several days after providing the detailed accounting, Interior officials told AP that in fact there had been only five citations, that one had been rescinded. The officials said they could not immediately say which of the six had been rescinded.

On Sunday, MMS officials said the 2007 citation was rescinded following an informal appeal, which they said can be granted by an inspector’s boss. In this case, further review showed the equipment in question complied with regulations, the officials said.

The agency’s problems with providing information extends to the data on display on its website. For example, the accounting of accident and incident reports is incomplete, making it very difficult to perform a thorough data analysis of the agency’s performance and preventing a full accurate tracking of safety records of the rigs.

Data problems go back at least a decade. According to John Shultz, who as a graduate student in the late 1990s studied MMS’ inspection program in depth for his dissertation, the agency’s data infrastructure was severely limited.

“If you have the data you need, the analysis becomes fairly straightforward. Without the data, you’re simply stuck with conjectures,” said Shultz, who now works in the Department of Energy’s nuclear program.

The strong inspection record led MMS last year to herald the Deepwater Horizon as an industry model for safety.

The Deepwater Horizon’s record was so exemplary, according to MMS officials, that the rig was never on inspectors’ informal “watch list” for problem rigs.

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Associated Press Writers Michael Kunzelman in New Orleans and Garance Burke in Fresno, Calif., contributed to this report.

OSHA targets exposure to stainless steel hazards

Working with stainless steel can pose a greater threat to workers than other metals. A new rule aims to give workers more information about exposure to hexavalent chromium, a carcinogen released when stainless steel is welded, cut with a plasma torch or cast.

The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration changed its notification requirements in March. Previously, employers didn’t have to share test results unless they showed that employees had been overexposed to hexavalent chromium.

Under the new rules, employers need to share that information no matter what levels of the carcinogen were found. The OSHA rules give construction employers five workdays to provide the required notice.

Oregon OSHA, required by law to have standards at least as effective as federal standards, is set to adopt the changes in June.

The more information that workers get about their health, the better, said Robert Brown, safety director with The Lynch Co., a Portland fabrication shop.

“We tend to be more of an over-compliance company in those areas,” Brown said. Company officials post test results on the employee safety board, whatever the results.

Lynch, founded in 1919, works with metals including high-polish architectural stainless steel and heavy structural stainless steel for high-rise buildings. Employers working around hexavalent chromium wear air samplers that are inspected by a third party.

If levels are high, the company makes adjustments to ensure better ventilation and less worker exposure.

Companies that don’t work extensively with stainless steel may not take special precautions, but they may not need to, said Melanie Mesaros, spokeswoman for Oregon OSHA.

Normal welding eye protection and gloves may suffice. Greater concentrations for longer periods may require that workers wear respirators.

Awareness of hexavalent chromium is increasing in light of the federal rule change, Mesaros said. “We’ve been getting more complaints about it and doing more inspections than we’ve done before,” she said.

Albina Pipe Bending in Tualatin doesn’t weld stainless steel often, said Brian Smith, the firm’s general manager. As a result, he said, it was unclear how much precaution employees needed to take.

The company requested an Oregon OSHA inspection, Smith said. “We had them come out and test and see what kind of readings we had.”

Even though the tests showed low levels, the company still takes precautions — such as welding hoods with respirators — when it works with stainless steel.

Because health effects of hexavalent chromium, including respiratory illness and cancer, can take a long time to develop, it’s important to stay on top of exposure levels, Mesaros said.

That’s different from many work-site hazards, she said. “When you have a fall protection issue, you know the effect right away.

“But there’s a lag time with this kind of health issue,” she said. “It could take months before a person starts getting sick.”

Again, a blast involving BP Company is already facing fines over safety

An enormous oil spill. A fiery explosion. Eleven presumed dead. And more questions about another catastrophic accident tied to an all-too-familiar company: BP

Though the Deepwater Horizon was owned and operated by Swiss company Transocean Ltd., it was leased by BP, a London-based multinational oil giant with the worst safety record of any major oil company operating refineries in the United States.

In October, Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis proposed fining BP Products North America Inc. $87.4 million in penalties for the company’s alleged failure to correct systemic problems that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and others identified after BP’s Texas City refinery exploded in 2005.

That accident killed 15 people and seriously injured more than 170 others.

The proposed fine is the largest in OSHA’s history. The previous record — a $21 million fine — also was issued against BP after various government investigations uncovered a systemic and cultural disregard for safety after the 2005 explosion.

And in March, OSHA proposed an additional $3 million in fines against BP North America Inc. and BP-Husky Refining LLC for “exposing workers to serious hazards” and to potential injury and death from explosion-related building collapses of nine buildings at its Ohio refinery.

“OSHA has found that BP often ignored or severely delayed fixing known hazards in its refineries,” Solis said. “There is no excuse for taking chances with people’s lives. BP must fix the hazards now.”

Focus on refineries

Since then, OSHA has focused its stepped-up enforcement efforts at all BP’s downstream operations, including refineries in Texas, Indiana, California, Washington and Ohio, U.S. Energy Information Administration records show.

BP continues to fight the latest proposed fines.

The company claims to have met OSHA safety improvement goals required in Texas City and has spent more than a billion dollars in improvements since the 2005 disaster.

BP officials did not comment for this story.

In an earlier statement, Texas City refinery manager Keith Casey said, “We remain committed to further enhancing our safety and compliance systems and achieving our goal of becoming an industry leader in process safety.”

Widespread concerns

Meanwhile, other government safety regulators, as well as state attorneys and U.S. Department of Justice prosecutors have targeted BP for alleged safety or environmental violations in various operations, including drilling in Alaska, refining operations in various states as well as minor accidents aboard other offshore platforms, according to records and press releases.

It has not yet been determined what might have caused the fire and explosion on the Deepwater Horizon, which caught fire as it was drilling for oil deep beneath the Gulf of Mexico.

Some critics, like Beaumont plaintiffs attorney Brent Coon, worry that BP may once again have neglected safety issues in its aggressive pursuit of profits.

Coon represented more than 100 people who filed suit against BP after the 2005 blast.

“They’re very smart, but they’re very greedy, and they know full well the limits of deferring maintenance and pushing the envelope and they’re willing to take those risks,” Coon said. “They make a conscious decision to accept a higher degree of risk of major catastrophes than other companies do.”

Lynne Baker, a spokesperson for United Steelworkers Union, which represents about 30,000 refinery workers nationwide, argues, however, that BP clearly has made progress.

“In spite of the company missing some of the OSHA deadlines and getting the increased fines, they have worked hard to get themselves in a better position in all the refineries,” Baker said.

BP increasingly is relying on its offshore operations in the Gulf of Mexico for its US profits, since refinery revenues have fallen with the price of oil, its most recent 2009 annual report shows.

Regardless of what safety inspectors eventually conclude about the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig disaster, BP will be held responsible for cleaning up the oil spill. This week, the company focused its onshore activity in five locations in the potentially affected states: Venice, La.; Pascagoula and Biloxi, Miss.; Mobile, Ala.; and Pensacola, Fla.

BP Group Chief Executive Tony Hayward has pledged that BP will cooperate fully with all government investigations.

Dust fire fourth since 2003 at Woode-Mode, Inc. plant in Kreamer, Pa

Tuesday’s fiery explosion in a Wood-Mode Inc. sawdust silo is the fourth in seven years, a record that jibes with national research suggesting that combustible dust is a serious industrial hazard.

According to an October 2009 report issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, there have been nearly 280 dust fires and explosions at industrial sites across the nation over the past 25 years. Those accidents have caused 130 fatalities and about 780 injuries.

None of the recent fires at Wood-Mode has resulted in injuries or deaths.

In January 2007, the plant was evacuated when an explosion occurred on a roof of one of the buildings when a spark ignited in blower system that collects sawdust.

Two months earlier, in November 2006, smoke was detected in a sawdust silo and prompted the plant to be closed for a day.

In June 2003, fire broke out in a sawdust mill and again caused a temporary closing of the plant.

Kenneth Walter, the Wood-Mode employee whose vehicle was crushed Tuesday by a lid that was blown off a silo, said he and other plant workers had just been talking about those past incidents on Monday.

“We were saying that it had been a while since there was a fire,” he said, shaking his head.

Mark Stelmack, area director of the Wilkes-Barre office of Occupational Safety and Health Administration, said he was informed of the Wood-Mode fire by the media and would investigate.

Companies are not required to report an incident unless a fatality occurs or three or more people are hospitalized as a result, Stelmack said.

While OSHA has visited Wood-Mode, Stelmack said he’s not aware of any accident investigations at the facility. An online database of OSHA records shows only two recent inspections at Wood-Mode.

There are no specific standards on combustible dust hazards, but he said OSHA does have certain requirements for employee protection.

OSHA has scheduled its latest informal stakeholder meetings to continue soliciting comments and suggestions for protecting workers from combustible dust hazards in the workplace. Since 1980, more than 130 workers have been killed and more than 780 injured in combustible dust explosions.

OSHA is holding a public hearing intended to develop a plan to better manage the dangers posed by industrial combustible dust later this month in Chicago. It is the third in a series of meetings prompted a Feb. 7, 2008, catastrophic explosion at the Imperial Sugar Co. plan in Port Wentworth, Ga., that killed 14 workers and led to $8.8 million in penalties. Combustible dusts are solids ground into fine particles, fibers, chips, chunks or flakes that can cause a fire or explosion when suspended in air under certain conditions. Types of dusts include metal (aluminum and magnesium), wood, plastic or rubber, coal, flour, sugar and paper, among others.

Kansas City, Missouri Worker Dies After Fall Through Roof

A roofing worker fell to his death through an opening in a roof of a Kansas City, Mo., building Saturday afternoon.The fall happened at about 4:25 p.m. in a building in the 1300 block of Chouteau Trafficway. The building in the complex is owned by Kansas City’s Municipal Works and Public Works departments. Workers from Kierber Roofing were working on a building that’s being rented out to a manufacturing company called Ameristeel.

OSHA officials investigated the fall. One worker said the man who fell was a signal man, meaning he directs the crane operator from the roof of the building. One worker told KCTV5 said a signal caller is one of the safest jobs on the site.The worker who spoke to KCTV5 said the accident happened during the deck change, a portion of the job where the old materials on the roof are stripped and new ones are put down.Police said the victim was not wearing a safety harness.

Construction workers at the scene said workers are only required to wear a harness when working within six feet of the building’s edge.”There are some guidelines where people can work in an environment without safety harnesses, such as if they have in place a safety monitoring system,” OSHA spokesman Jay Vicory said. “Again, whether a harness was in place or not that needs to be determined.”

An OSHA investigation is standard procedure whenever there’s a workplace accident. Vicory said OSHA finished their work Saturday and will review the investigation Sunday or sometime during the week.

City judge hears arguments on evidence in Kleen Energy plant explosion

MIDDLETOWN, CT — Superior Court Judge Robert L. Holzberg asked attorneys to work out an agreement over access to evidence in the Kleen Energy Systems power plant explosion at a hearing Monday and to come back to court next week.

Attorneys Robert Reardon and M. H. Reese Norris, representing three workers present at the plant on the day of the blast and the wife of a worker who was killed, are seeking to have their own experts look over evidence in advance of potentially filing a civil suit against companies responsible for the plant’s construction.

The Feb. 7 blast killed six workers and injured at least 26.

New Jersey-based gas explosion expert Dehong Kong, Massachusetts-based fire ignition and origin expert Thomas Klem and famed forensic scientist Henry Lee were on the plant site Friday for four hours and took more than 200 pictures as part of their investigation for Reardon and Norris. Their visit was supervised by a U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration lawyer and an OSHA investigator, Reardon said.

Jeffrey Blueweiss, a lawyer for plant general contractor O&G Industries, said Monday he did not object to allowing access to evidence and would give the same courtesy to other victims’ attorneys. But he said an agreement between O&G, plant owner Kleen Energy Systems, OSHA and the U.S. Chemical Safety Board may mean that those federal agencies, which were not named in the petition for a bill of discovery, would have say in the matter.

State’s Attorney Timothy J. Liston, citing law enforcement investigative privilege, objected to allowing Norris and Reardon’s experts access to the at least 75 pieces of evidence that police have collected, including a diagram that shows where the evidence was taken from and where injured and killed workers were found.

“The evidence has to remain secured,” Liston said. “We can’t trot it out any time anyone expresses an interest.”

Middletown Acting City Attorney Timothy Lynch added that allowing access to the diagram and inventory “could be prejudicial to law enforcement action.”

In court Monday, Blueweiss said he would make copies of surveillance tapes from the site for Reardon and Norris, and Holzberg requested that Reardon and Norris at least provide evidence of consent from OSHA and the U.S. Chemical Safety Board to any access given.

O&G and Kleen Energy Systems also agreed to hold up demolition on the site at least until next week. The plant owners have taken out permits to demolish three buildings comprising the plant and to rebuild three others, including the power block building, from the city Building Department, state prosecutor Maureen Platt said.

Blueweiss said he hoped the permits could be acted on speedily, although he also said that chemical safety board investigators have suspended their on-site investigation for three weeks so that hazards can be cleared and are hoping to later return for another three days of investigation.

“We very much need to do the work referenced in the permits in order to put people back to work,” he said.

Hannah Vahl can be reached by e-mail at hvahl@middletownpress.com.